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A laptop computer sitting on top of a desk
Photo by Glen Carrie

Regulation and Data Center Risk

By Branko Terzic
& Edited By R. Bruce Williamson

One of the fundamental principles of public utility rate making is, according to James Bonbright in Principles of Public Utility Rates, that “the rates will be designed with the old legal maxim ‘Let the beneficiary bear the burden.’”   Another way of stating this is that the “cost causer is the cost payer.”  Restating it later in Principles, Bonbright admonishes that “consumers…should be required to pay rates not seriously out of line with costs of rendition.” As this is from a 1968 textbook for regulators, it is clear that US electric utility regulators ought to be fully aware of this principle. Utility regulators also have a number of regulatory tools to ensure that costs are attributed to the cost causer. So why do so many pundits on public utility regulation claim that the addition of new data centers will result in a shift of data center energy costs to other consumers?

A New York Times article ”Price of Data Centers May Spread” (May 19, 2025) reported on a Wood MacKenzie study of large power users. The article quoted the MacKenzie study to say that “…the money that large energy users paid to electric utilities would not cover the cost of the equipment needed to serve them. The rest of the costs would be borne by other utility customers or the utility itself.”

If the MacKenzie quote is an accurate description of the situation for large customers, it can only be true if the state regulator(s) responsible either (A) created that rate subsidy as a policy decision or (B) MacKenzie used cost allocation assumptions for  ”used and useful” utility plant in their calculations that differ from the actual cost allocations used by utility commissions. The regulators are in control, and moreover, a deviation from fair and reasonable methods of cost allocation would quickly come before the regulators in proceedings to right the wrong to aggrieved customers.

What regulatory tools do the state utility regulatory commissions have to ensure electricity rates are not increased to other customers when a utility investment is made to serve a new large customer?  We have two industry situations to consider, restructured electric utility states and traditional vertically integrated electric utility states.

Restructured Electric Utility States

Keep in mind that in the restructured states the electric utility only provides transmission level service (i.e., 138kv) to large customers with a high voltage transmission line and a substation. Notably, the electric energy is procured by that new customer itself in the local FERC-regulated ISO wholesale power market, and the utility simply passes the electric energy through to the customer.  There are a number of rate treatments for the utiliy’s cost of the transmission line and the substation required by the large data center customer,   Let’s look at the standard practices involved in allocating costs.

If the new data center requires an upgrade to the line conductor or substation, or a line extension from the existing high voltage existing transmission system, or both, the well accepted “line extension” policies would require the new customer to pay for any costs in excess of what is currently embedded in rates for a customer in that rate class. The data center customer would pay the excess, and it would be booked by the utility as “contributed plant.” It would not flow into rates for other customers.

Another option, depending on the specific facts, might be to create a new customer class tailored to fit the usage characteristic of the data center class. This new rate would include the higher new costs of service specific to that class of customers. No additional costs would be allocated to existing customer who did not benefit from the new investment.

Traditional Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities

For the traditional electric utility, the utility franchise requires the utility to (1) serve all customers and (2) to do so without “undue discrimination.”  Different rates for electricity consumers based on a fair and reasonable cost allocation methodology are allowable under that standard. Putting it another way, “different costs lead to different rates.”

Traditional utilities would generally have the same line extension policies as restructured utilities. Access to power supply, however, is via the incumbent electric utility. The data center has the option of self-generating all or part of its power requirement. The incumbent electric utility can add generation or purchase at wholesale rates  additional generation needed for the data center.  Neither method needs to raise rates to other customers with a utility regulatory commission that ensures the data center is on a tariffed rate with the accepted methods of cost allocation.

There have been occasions when legislative policy (not the regulator) has sought special rate tariffs to promote economic development zones or incentivize specific customers for employment or opportunity outcomes. The allocation of fair costs under legislatively mandated special rate tariffs sometimes depart from the Bonbright and accepted “fair and reasonable” standards as political decisions, not the economic regulator’s standard, and may well pass costs on to other customers of the utility.  In these cases, the legislature determines, and the regulator by law must enact a special rate tariff which is believed to foster economic benefits for certain customers in the development zones, with costs passed on generally to all customers.  In fact, these are policy-ordered subsidies, and a form of price discrimination, which when applied should be used sparingly out of concern for “fair and reasonable” regulatory practice and the benefit to the target audience vs the cost to ratepayers monitored.

Premature Retirement

So far we have discussed cost allocation when a data center first arrives in a utility’s service territory.  But what happens in the case an investment is made for a data center which goes out of business a few years hence? Do the remaining customers get stuck with the costs incurred by the utility on behalf of the data center?

There would need to be some facts determined.  Are there other new customers who could benefit from the original investment? If a data center went bankrupt could a new owner find it economically feasible to continue operation and continue purchasing electricity  services? Did the rate design for the data center electric service include higher depreciation rates aligned with a shorter service period, in which case the data center has already paid for its full impact on the incumbent’s utility system?

When it comes to the matter of how long an entity will be part of an electric utility’s service load, it is at best a guess, because so many circumstances are beyond any reasonable degree of control. Ultimately, a regulated traditional electric utility, losing permanently a large electric load could end up with “stranded costs” in generation and transmission. (A restructured utility would only have transmission and substation related costs “stranded” for the data center.) The options for treatment of stranded costs are numerous.  I won’t list them all. The key question is whether the IOU investors or ratepayers will absorb the stranded costs.

One approach to solving the problem is for the regulator to find that some of the generation and or/transmission capacity is now no longer “used and useful” (and won’t be so in the future) and should be written off by the utility now with the costs borne by the equity investor. The other approach to solving the problem is for the economic regulator to find that the transmission related investment for the data center was legally mandated by the utility franchise’s universal service requirement and neither the utility management, which proposed rates for the new Data Centers, nor the PSC regulator. who approved the rates, had access to a crystal ball which could foresee the earlier than anticipated loss of customer load. Thus, in this second approach, the stranded costs are a cost of doing business and should be recovered in rates to remaining customers.

BT: A thank you goes out to R. Bruce Williamson, Ph.D. former Commissioner on the Maine Public Service Commission for his review and thoughtful comments. 


The Honorable Branko Terzic is a former Commissioner on the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and State of Wisconsin Public Service Commission, in addition to energy industry experience was a US Army Reserve Foreign Area Officer ( FAO) for Eastern Europe (1979-1990). He hold a BS Engineering and honorary Doctor of Sciences in Engineering (h.c.) both from the University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee. 

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